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EDITORIAL NOTE
This publication presents the r esults of SAMP’s 2003 Potential Skills
Base survey (PSBS) in four SADC countries. The PSBS was also imple-
mented in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The survey results from those
two countries have already appeared in the Migration Policy Series as
Nos. 36 and 39. SAMP has also published an overview of the region as
a whole as Migration Policy Series No. 35. SAMP wishes to thank the
research teams in each of the six countries surveyed and, in particular,
the managers of the studies: Eugene Campbell, Thuso Green, Hamilton
Simelane, Bob Mattes, Selma Nangulah, and Dan Tevera. Wade
Pendleton and Bruce Frayne played a major supporting role. Christa
Schier assisted in data coordination and David Dorey and Monica
Gyimah helped in the editing of this publication. Our particular thanks
go to the over 10,000 students who agreed to participate in the survey
and who may find it of interest to compare their views with those of
other students across the SADC region. 
CHAPTER 1
VULNERABLE STATES
JONATHAN CRUSH
1
INTRODUCTION
Skills emigration or the “brain drain” has become a major policyand research issue at the national, regional and continentallevel in Africa.1 African governments emerged from colonialismwith a woefully inadequate skills base. After independence,
most invested heavily in skills creation, universalizing access to primary
and secondary education, setting up new universities and training col-
leges, offering generous financial support in the form of grants and bur-
saries to students, and sponsoring the brightest and most promising to
go overseas for advanced training. Coupled with a complementary strat-
egy of temporary import of expatriate skills, this strategy seemed to pay
off in many countries. The skills base of many countries expanded rap-
idly and most locally-trained citizens were absorbed into the public and
private sectors. 
Concerns first began to surface in the 1980s when increasing num-
bers of students sent overseas for further training stopped returning
home and began a new life elsewhere. Then, in the 1990s, a new trend
began to emerge in Southern Africa (mirroring an earlier trend in West
and East Africa). Home-grown professionals began to look outside their
own countries for employment. Part of this had to do with conditions at
home. Cer tainly, economic mismanagement, political instability and
civil strife made other pastures appear much greener. But externally-
driven economic forces, such as Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAP’s), debt repayment and global trade imbalances plunged many
small economies into crisis. Unemployment soared and working condi-
tions deteriorated in country after country. The better-managed
economies escaped and, as a consequence, skills tended to stay at home.
On the demand side, many “developed” economies abandoned restric-
tionist immigration policies and actively sought out skills from other
countries. In the face of falling birth rates, graying populations and (for
some at least) their own brain drains, the countries of Africa presented
a ripe picking field.2
Considerable attention is now focused on the size and impact of the
African brain drain and how to develop workable retention strategies to
keep skilled people at home.3 Moral suasion appears to be having some
impact through a growing number of international agreements to con-
trol recruiting and hiring of African skills. At home, governments are
considering a range of options to try and persuade newly-minted skills
to stay or at least stick for a while. The word from most professionals,
however, is that only fundamental economic reform and a change in
quality of life and economic prospects will quell the search for employ-
ment overseas.4 To date, however, the debate has been couched very
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much in binary terms. The North gains and the South loses. The North
poaches and the South suffers. Brain drains within the North and South
receive much less attention, not because they do not exist but perhaps
because the moral issues are trickier to articulate and champion.
Certain large African countries, notably South Africa and Nigeria,
are suffering major losses of skilled personnel to the North.5 They also
have the potential to be major beneficiaries of an intra-continental
brain drain. The temptation to recruit replacement skills from other
African countries may become virtually irresistible. South Africa has
resisted temptation for the best part of a decade.6 After 1994, there were
fears in many African countries that their skills base would be severely
depleted by South Africa. This has not happened. According to the SA
Census, the number of SADC citizens in South Africa increased by
only 40,000 between 1996 and 2001.7 The vast majority of SADC citi-
zens in South Africa in 2001 were unskilled and semi-skilled migrants.
The numbers from elsewhere in Africa only increased from 9,873 to
24,978 between 1996 and 2001, many of whom were probably refugees
(Table 1.1). 8 Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho send the greatest
number of migrants to South Africa, but Namibia, Swaziland and
Botswana also have significant numbers of migrants in the country
(Table 1.2) Table 1.3 shows that the numbers of skilled African immi-
grants to South Africa fell during the 1990s from most countries, and
has only recently begun to increase again.
The reason for the absence of a brain drain to South Africa lies pri-
marily in that country’s immigration policies post-1994. These policies
were based on the assumption that immigration of any kind was a
“threat” to the interests of South Africa’s newly-enfranchised.9 This
argument held for the best part of the 1990s. The primary result was
that the much-anticipated (and feared in source countries) flood of
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Table 1.1: Foreign Citizens in South Africa by Region of Origin
Citizenship 1996 2001
SADC Countries 281,601 320,174
Rest of Africa 9,873 24,978
Europe 109,622 88,758
Asia 14,850 16,311
North America 5,331 5,830
Central & South America 12,902 4,761
Australia/New Zealand 2,896 2,197
Total 437,075 463,009
Source: SA Census
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Table 1.2: Foreign-Born Residents of South Africa, SADC Countries
SADC Member State No. Living in South Africa
Angola 11,806
Botswana 17,819
DR Congo 4,541
Lesotho 114,941
Madagascar 220
Malawi 25,090
Mauritius 3,500
Mozambique 269,669
Namibia 46,225
Swaziland 34,471
Tanzania 3,923
Zambia 23,550
Zimbabwe 131,887
Source: SA Census
Table 1.3: Legal Immigration to South Africa by Country of Origin, 1994-2004
SADC 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Angola 2 0 7 10 9 20 0 0 0 0 0 48
Bots- 48 28 50 32 24 20 12 21 37 0 0 272
wana
DRC 244 78 93 75 49 44 42 0 0 0 0 625
L e s o t h o 227 222 233 130 141 105 92 118 123 237 272 1900
Malawi 68 85 96 48 37 118 20 0 0 174 198 844
Mauri- 38 39 51 51 31 24 13 40 87 56 11 441
tius
Mozam. 45 41 53 42 50 556 11 198 0 187 282 1465
N a m i b i a 15 9 34 34 14 9 8 2 3 0 0 128
Swazi- 110 83 97 51 51 33 0 0 0 0 191 616
land
Tanz- 4 0 18 16 3 14 7 0 0 0 0 62
ania
Zambia 75 66 69 63 72 52 38 86 101 0 140 762
Zimba- 556 405 394 270 300 177 88 326 464 959 1041 4980
bwe
Other Africa
Ghana 72 0 149 151 117 74 70 0 0 248 190 1071
Kenya 38 24 47 48 81 44 34 0 0 148 149 613
Nigeria 25 45 66 77 34 40 87 198 631 1698 224 3125
Uganda 12 0 51 86 29 18 39 79 111 0 0 425
skills to South Africa did not eventuate.
Since 2000, three developments have made the prospect of a brain
drain to South Africa far more likely. First, the ANC government has
become convinced that the country is unable to contain its own skills
brain drain and is in the midst of a “skills crisis.” A more open immigra-
tion policy is therefore needed. Although it is an extremely cumber-
some piece of legislation, the 2002 Immigration Act (as amended in
2004) has, as an avowed outcome, easing the import of skills from out-
side the country.10 Second, a SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation
of Movement of Persons has recently been ratified by six countries,
including South Africa.11 The Protocol was first mooted as long ago as
1995 and has remained on the drawing board for a decade, largely
because of South African opposition.12 South Africa’s change of position
is consistent with the new openness towards immigration. The Protocol,
when in force, should make it easier for skilled people from the rest of
SADC to work in South Africa (and vice-versa). Third, political and
economic conditions in a number of neighbouring states (notably
Zimbabwe) continue to deteriorate. The number of skilled
Zimbabweans (and other SADC citizens) moving to South Africa has
recently begun to escalate.13
Just because South Africa opens its doors, it does not automatically
follow that everyone will automatically go through them. In the late
1990s, SAMP undertook surveys of working professionals in a number
of SADC states and found that there was a high, though country-specif-
ic, level of interest in relocating. 14 The SAMP Potential Skills Base
Survey (PSBS), implemented in 2003, attempted to project this sce-
nario into the future. What are today’s students thinking about their
future? Is emigration a part of their plans? Are they satisfied with things
at home or are they likely to leave at the first available opportunity?
And, if they do leave, will they return and/or r etain strong links while
they are gone? 
The PSBS was conducted in six SADC countries (Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). Over
10,000 final year students in universities, technical colleges and other
higher education institutions across the region were interviewed. The
regional picture that emerged showed considerable variation from coun-
try to country in the emigration potential of SADC students. As the
summary report, Degrees of Uncertainty, concluded:
The emigration potential of SADC students on graduation
is high and economic factors are paramount when students
consider what to do in the future. The primary losers from
the brain drain of new skills are likely to be Zimbabwe,
Swaziland and Lesotho. The primary beneficiaries are likely
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to be North America and Europe and, within the region,
South Africa and Botswana. South Africa, at the same
time, is likely to be both a victim and a beneficiary of the
brain drain.15
This rather sobering conclusion draws attention to the fundamental
contradiction that lies at the heart of policy responses to the brain
drain. The fact is that SADC is a regional grouping of states of which
one, South Africa, is by far the most powerful economically and offers
better wages and working conditions to skilled people than anywhere
else. If the policy and legislative gates that made it difficult to legally
emigrate to South Africa during the 1990s now swing open, the rush
from poorer neighbouring countries could become overwhelming. The
impact on the public service and private sector in South Africa’s neigh-
bours could be catastrophic.
Against this backdrop, SAMP’s PSBS findings in these states become
of considerable interest. How do tomorrow’s skilled professionals in
small countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
view life in their own country? How satisfied are they with conditions
and prospects at home? What comparisons do they make between life at
home and a prospective new life across the border in South Africa?
How strongly does South Africa feature in their emigration plans? What
measures could their home governments take to encourage them to
stay? Those are the obvious questions raised by the PSBS and addressed
in this policy paper.
The other set of concerns is prompted by the decision to publish four
case studies in a single volume. Not only does this provide important
opportunities for comparison between four vulnerable states, but it also
allows policy makers in each state to take stock of the particular situa-
tion and case-specific challenges that they face. The four countries cho-
sen are all small (in terms of population size) and highly vulnerable to
“poaching” and skills loss to South Africa. Historically, they are all
heavily integrated into the South African economy and labour market
(for example, there were no border controls between BLS and South
Africa before 1963). Citizens of the BLS states also share many cultural
similarities and family ties with Tswana, Sesotho and SiSwati-speaking
South Africans. 
Botswana has much the str ongest economy of the four and hitherto
has probably offered better employment prospects to its new graduates.16
Lesotho has a long tradition of migration to South Africa and much
poorer, though fluctuating, employment prospects for new graduates.17
Swaziland’s economy is in serious trouble and the prospects for new
graduates are probably dimmer than at any time since Independence.18
Namibia has virtually no history of skilled, black, migration to South
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Africa. That may be about to change as more and more Namibian stu-
dents take up places at South African universities and the friction of
distance between the two countries is reduced through air travel.19
This publication demonstrates that despite many differences, new
graduates in all four countries will emerge with degrees and certificates
that they also see as passports to better jobs and standards of living in
South Africa (and abroad). Nearby South Africa is still the destination
of choice for newly-minted graduates in these countries. Given the
changing attitudes in South Africa towards immigration and the immi-
nent lowering of the obstacles to skilled migrants, the governments of
these four countries face a potentially critical situation. The HIV/AIDS
epidemic is already eating away at their professional classes. An intra-
regional brain drain will only exacerbate the crisis. True, many emi-
grants will retain strong links with home but this needs to be encour-
aged not assumed. But fundamentally, only economic reform and growth
is going to keep people at home. This publication is designed to sound
the alarm rather than provide solutions. 
Governments face an uphill struggle if they are going to keep stu-
dents at home, capitalize on their desire to serve, and recoup their
investment in skills development. Failing that, governments should be
letting down their own drawbridges, taking advantage of the new global
mobility of skilled professionals and importing skills trained elsewhere.
They tr uly ought to be considering that already. If nothing else, the
findings in this publication should prompt serious reflection on the via-
bility of continuing with the nationalistic, restrictive immigration and
migration policies that have characterized Southern Africa since the
1960s.
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8CHAPTER 2
THE POTENTIAL BRAIN DRAIN FROM BOTSWANA
EUGENE K. CAMPBELL
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the Botswana government has invested heavilyin human resource development.20 The highest proportion ofrecurrent expenditure in the national budget is in the educa-tional sector (30% in 2003-4, compared with only 7% on
health). Post-independence educational investment led to the rapid
expansion of primary and secondary education. Between 1985 and
1991, for example, secondary school enrolment increased from 38% to
65% of eligible children. Admission to degree programmes at the
University of Botswana increased by almost 150% over the same period.
Students studying subjects not offered at the University of Botswana
were sponsored by the government to study in Europe and the USA.
With very few exceptions, Batswana who studied outside the country
were happy to return home and contribute to the country’s healthy
economy.
Government is more involved in funding tertiary education than in
any other SADC state. Eighty eight percent of students are on govern-
ment bursaries (with only 14% not involving some form of payback).
Conversely, Batswana students have one of the lowest levels of family
and individual financial support. Botswana also demands more payback
in terms of public service than the government of any other country
(53% of bursaries compared to a regional average of only 31%). 
Unlike other countries in Southern Africa, Botswana does not have
a history of skilled emigration.21 However, for the first time there are sig-
nals of an imminent brain drain from the country. In 2002, the
Botswana Minister of Health declared the situation an emergency, and
appealed to health professionals to be patriotic and stay to help impr ove
the health status of the population at home. Ironically, a few months
later, the Minister himself resigned and left for Europe to work with the
United Nations. 
Botswana frequently receives international commendation for its
economic policies and rapid growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Botswana
is among only a handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa with vibrant
economies.22 Before the 1990s, university students were practically guar-
anteed jobs on graduation. By the mid-1990s, it was increasingly obvi-
ous that government was unable to implement a policy of full employ-
ment for university graduates. Inevitably, government’s policy of recruit-
ing experienced skilled migrants from outside the country was resented
as a major source of graduate unemployment.23 The pr ospect and experi-
ence of unemployment, plus the increasingly ostentatious display of
wealth by the employed, have served to inflate aspirations, expectations
and tastes.
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Botswana has always recognized the importance of importing skills
(brain gain) and training (brain train) in a way that makes it unique in
the r egion. However, if jobs for all Batswana cannot be guaranteed, it is
inevitable that resentment against foreigners will increase. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that the tide has already turned and skilled non-
nationals ar e feeling increasingly unwelcome.24 The other consequence
of the absence of guaranteed employment is that Batswana are going to
become more interested in leaving the country and use their locally-
acquired skills to market themselves internationally. A decade ago, a
study of this nature would probably have revealed little interest amongst
students in leaving the country. This chapter sets out to discover if this
situation has changed, and if so, to suggest reasons why this might be.
STUDENT PROFILE IN BOTSWANA
The PSBS study in Botswana surveyed a representative sampleof final year students in tertiary training institutions. The sur-vey was conducted between October 2002 and January 2003.With the exception of a few non-accredited health institu-
tions, the University of Botswana and all health and teacher training
institutes were included in the survey. The institutions surveyed includ-
ed the University of Botswana (UB) and Botswana College of
Education (BCA), Botswana Institute of Accounting and Commerce
(BIAC), Institutes of Health Sciences in Gaborone, Lobatse, Serowe
and Francistown, and Colleges of Education in Tlokweng, Lobatse,
Serowe, Tonota and Francistown. Initially, the health and teacher train-
ing institutes in Molepolole were included but, due to difficulties in
reaching students, they were eventually excluded from the study.
The sample was drawn from the cluster of final year students and the
proportion (25% of the total) is reasonably large. Out of 1,201 students
inter viewed, 63% (756) were female and 37% (445) male. Forty-three
percent were less than 24 years of age. About 78% spoke mostly
Setswana at home, and the rest Kalanga. The majority were studying in
Certificate or Diploma programmes (45%) or in Bachelors degree pro-
grammes (41%). Less than 10% were studying for Master’s degrees.
Some 62% of students were either in teacher training colleges or in
Faculties of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of
Botswana. 
Females dominated the liberal ar ts and political and administration
areas, while males dominated the sciences. Nearly all (95%) were full-
time students. Over three quarters were sponsored by the national gov-
ernment, with greater levels of sponsorship given to younger female stu-
dents. The conditions of government sponsorship require them to work
for the government for at least a short time after graduating. About
one-third of the sponsorships had no condition attached.
Botswana has invested heavily in female education in the last two
decades and the sample derived for this study was therefore female-dom-
inated. An important issue raised by this finding is whether there is any
gender difference in proclivity to stay or emigrate. The question is
whether males and females are acquiring internationally marketable
skills equally. Nursing, for example, is a heavily female-dominated pro-
fession in Botswana and African nurses are certainly in demand in
Europe. On the other hand, are females accessing “professional” and sci-
ence-based degrees in the same proportions as men or are they still
“ghettoized” in the social sciences and humanities? These are important
questions because all forms of higher education do not make students
equally mobile. 
STUDENT ATTITUDES TO EMIGRATION
Batswana students identify very strongly with their country. Thevast majority (93%) were proud to be citizens and almost 90%said they would want their children to consider themselvesBatswana. Virtually all (95%) expressed a strong desire to assist
with economic and social development in the country. Around three
quarters (77%) believe that they have a very important role to play in
the future development of Botswana. This is education-specific, with
the degree of enthusiasm falling as the educational level increases.
Despite the general health of the Botswana economy, however, only
17% of the students are satisfied or very satisfied with their current eco-
nomic circumstances. There is no significant difference between males
and females. However, nearly 70% anticipate that their personal eco-
nomic circumstances will be better or much better five years hence.
This expression of hope is significantly influenced by expected level of
educational achievement on completion of their studies. Males are cer-
tainly more optimistic about their economic future than females. 
The anticipation of a brighter personal future is positively correlated
with perceptions of the current and future well-being of the national
economy. Nevertheless, the students are not as optimistic about the
future of the national economy. Just 38% are satisfied or very satisfied
with the current state of the economy and only 42% feel things will be
better or much better in five years’ time. These attitudes are partly
explained by a loss of confidence in the ability of the government to
provide an environment of full employment for graduates. Over 80%
think that the government has not done enough to ease graduate unem-
ployment. Only 14% anticipate an improvement in the prospect of
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finding a desirable job after graduating and just 21% anticipate
improvement in the conditions for personal advancement. 
The majority of students are not particularly positive about future
socio-economic conditions in the country (Table 2.1). Over 60% expect
that the cost of living, job availability, taxation, housing availability
and the HIV/AIDS epidemic will get worse. On no single social or eco-
nomic indicator do a majority of students feel that the situation will
improve (although a significant minority are confident of improvements
in income, the quality of public services and the availability of quality
affordable products). Less than 40% are optimistic about future
prospects of finding good schools in Botswana for children or good med-
ical services for the family.
Due to a recent increase in crime (including physical and sexual
assault, house breaking and ro b b e ry), perceptions of personal safety have
declin ed considerably since the late 1990s. Almost 50% of s tudents
expect person al security to get worse in th e future; only 29% of working
p rofession als felt  the same when this question was asked in 1998.2 5
Does the level of student dissatisfaction translate into an interest in
or desire to leave the country? Almost a quarter (22%) say they intend
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Table 2.1: Expectations of the Future in Botswana.
Expectation of the Future (%)
Socio-Economic Condition in 5 years Better Same Worse
Cost of living 20.4 12.7 66.9
Ability to find job I want 13.6 12.9 73.4
Prospect for professional advancement 27.9 22.5 49.6
HIV/AIDS situation 21.3 9.5 69.1
Job security 27.1 35.7 37.2
Income level 47.3 24.8 27.9
Ability of find desirable house 22.8 14.6 62.6
Ability to find good school for children 37.5 23.8 38.7
Ability to find medical services for family 38.7 25.5 35.8
Fair taxation 11.8 29.3 59.0
Personal Safety 23.9 28.4 47.7
Family’s safety 24.1 29.8 46.1
Future of children 38.9 21.3 39.8
Quality upkeep of public amenities 40.2 26.5 33.3
Availability of affordable quality products 40.6 25.8 33.6
Customer Service 40.1 28.7 31.2
N=1,201
to leave Botswana within six months of graduation. There is no signifi-
cant difference between males and females. Nor are intentions influ-
enced by level of educational attainment or type of programme. The
proportion of potential emigrants increases to 40% within two years,
and 51% within five. More than half of all students say they are likely
to live and work outside Botswana for a short period of time. Around
half (49%) believe that they could easily find employment in their most
likely destination (MLD). Males are more certain than females about
this. About 46% of students say they cannot afford the cost of emigrat-
ing to their MLD.
Table 2.2 shows the proportion of students who have considered
emigration who give a particular reason for wanting to emigrate
(including the primary reasons and the average of the primary, second-
ary and tertiary (PST) reasons). Again, there is no significant difference
between male and female answers. Income levels are cited most often
(38% as the primary reason and 23% on average). Job availability is
next, followed by prospects for professional advancement. On average,
professional advancement is marginally more important than job avail-
ability. Housing, consumer service, quality of public amenities and 
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Table 2.2: Reasons for Consideration of Emigration from Botswana
Reason Primary Reason (%) Average of PST Reasons (%)
Cost of living 16.7 11.9
Ability to find job 13.6 9.9
Prospect for professional advancement 13.4 14.0
HIV/AIDS situation 3.7 3.9
Job security 2.4 3.7
Income level 37.9 22.9
Ability to find house 0.3 1.9
Good school for children 2.9 7.5
Medical service for family 1.4 5.4
Fair taxation level 1.7 2.3
Personal safety 1.6 2.9
Family’s safety 0.9 1.6
Future of children in Botswana 1.3 3.8
Quality of public amenities 0.7 1.9
Affordable quality product 1.1 4.4
Customer service 0.3 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: PST = primary, secondary and tertiary.
N=699
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family safety have very little influence. Very few cite the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the country as a reason for leaving despite the likely eco-
nomic impact of the disease. The rate of increase in gross domestic
product (GDP) is projected to halve by 2010 (falling from 4.3% to
2.4%), poverty to increase by up to 6%, and household per capita
income to fall by up to 10%.26
About 80% of the students feel they would be better off living in
Europe, North America or Australia/New Zealand than in Botswana
(see Table 2.3). South Africa was a distant second, with almost half
(49%) thinking it would be better to live there than in Botswana.
Students in Botswana have a low opinion of the quality of life within
other countries in the SADC. Male students are generally more positive
than female students about conditions in South Africa.
Among those who are considering leaving, North America is the
MLD (33%). Europe is a close second (31%), while South Africa is the
third choice. The least preferred destinations are elsewhere in Africa
and Asia. 
Table 2.3: Opinions about Living Conditions in Botswana and Other Countries.
Other country    Anticipated Living Condition
compared Better Same Worse
to Botswana
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Lesotho 24.9 26.5 34.4 37.7 40.7 35.8
Mozambique 11.8 10.9 17.5 23.2 70.7 65.8
Namibia 21.3 21.5 47.9 47.7 30.8 30.8
Swaziland 18.8 18.4 37.4 42.2 43.8 39.5
Zimbabwe 7.1 6.6 5.4 5.6 87.5 87.9
South Africa 53.5 46.3 31.2 27.5 15.3 26.1
Angola 14.4 10.3 17.7 26.4 67.9 63.3
Malawi 10.7 9.5 29.7 27.5 59.6 63.0
Zambia 9.5 8.7 15.1 21.3 75.4 70.0
East Africa 13.4 15.5 24.5 20.3 62.1 64.2
West Africa 14.8 16.9 19.6 19.4 65.6 63.7
Central Africa 11.2 14.7 25.7 25.3 63.1 60.0
North Africa 27.7 20.4 30.4 25.4 41.9 54.0
Europe 82.0 79.9 11.2 10.2 6.8 9.9
North America 79.6 80.3 11.3 10.1 9.7 9.6
Australia / 79.1 77.8 12.4 13.0 8.5 9.2
New Zealand
Asia / China 54.2 45.2 21.8 23.1 24.0 31.7
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Overwhelmingly, students of both sexes believe that income levels
are better in their MLD than in Botswana (Table 2.4). More males than
females anticipate a better cost of living in the MLD. Both believe that
prospects for professional advancement are much better in the MLD.
The MLD predictably features better on just about every economic
measure. Botswana only features significantly better in the area of per-
sonal and family safety.
Would Botswana’s new graduates leave temporarily or permanently?
Only 11% say they would want to be away for less than one year. The
peak preferred duration of stay in the MLD (42%) is two to five years.
However, nearly a third (29%) say they would opt for a more perma-
nent departure (greater than five years). Males are significantly more
interested in long duration emigration than females. Over a third say
they would want to become permanent residents of their MLD; a
stronger sentiment among males than females. Over a quarter want citi-
zenship in the MLD (again, more males than females). The same pr o-
portion of students say they would prefer to retire in the MLD. These
findings certainly indicate significant interest among a minority of stu-
dents in leaving Botswana for good.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The government of Botswana has a potentially significant prob-lem on its hands. Despite high levels of commitment to thecountry and an expectation of a reasonably bright personaland general economic future, there is significant interest in
leaving the country. Europe and North America are the preferred desti-
nations but South Africa also emerges as a potentially significant desti-
nation for the newly-skilled.
What options are available to government to retain new graduates?
Students themselves have strong opinions about what would and would
not work. Over half (59%) would find it justified if the government of
Botswana required citizens to complete some form of non-military
national service before enrolling in a tertiary educational institution
(Table 2.5). Significantly more males than females shared this view. Just
under half (47%) think it would be justified if they were required to
work in the country after completing their studies. Given the high-level
of tied sponsorship in Botswana, this suggests a certain amount of dis-
gruntlement with having to “pay back” in the form of public service.
The survey showed that even if the gover nment were to implement
a policy that made it difficult to emigrate, 28% of students would still
proceed to live and work outside Botswana. A requirement of one year
of national service would actually encourage a third of students to 
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Table 2.4: Comparison of Botswana with Most Likely Destination
Opinion
Better in Same Better in MLD
Botswana
Cost of living Male 37.4 13.2 49.4
Female 46.7 12.0 41.3
Ability to find a job Male 32.0 19.2 48.8
Female 40.9 21.3 37.8
Prospect for professional Male 20.5 13.8 65.7
advancement Female 23.1 19.2 57.7
HIV / AIDS situation Male 6.8 24.2 69.0
Female 13.3 30.9 55.8
Job security Male 37.0 22.4 40.6
Female 40.2 23.5 36.3
Income level Male 13.2 10.4 76.4
Female 14.6 12.4 73.0
Ability to find house Male 24.6 17.7 57.7
Female 28.6 20.6 50.8
Good school for children Male 18.8 12.9 68.3
Female 23.6 16.1 60.3
Medial service for family Male 20.4 16.3 63.3
Female 26.9 16.4 56.7
Fair taxation level Male 34.7 27.5 37.8
Female 34.7 31.7 33.6
Personal safety Male 53.5 17.2 29.3
Female 48.3 22.8 28.9
Family’s safety Male 55.5 17.9 26.6
Female 52.7 21.2 26.1
Future of children in Male 36.1 17.5 46.4
Botswana Female 39.7 19.5 40.8
Quality of public Male 15.1 12.9 72.0
amenities Female 16.6 17.4 66.0
Affordable quality Male 11.5 11.3 77.2
product Female 16.0 14.7 69.3
Customer service Male 11.1 17.4 71.5
Female 16.6 24.0 59.4
N = 1,201
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emigrate. Generally, policies designed to restrict emigration are there-
fore likely to defer but not stop the implementation of emigration
intentions. If the government were to implement measures to encourage
the return of qualified professionals from abroad, 70% of students would
be in favour. The general opinion (78%) is that emigration will not
abate if the government does nothing to encourage highly skilled pro-
fessionals to stay.
A solution to the threatened brain drain in Botswana does not lie in
policies to try and directly dissuade new graduates from leaving. Rather
it lies in government’s ability to demonstrate that it is actively working
towards implementing a massive economic development policy. About
88% of students feel that a vigorous economic drive by the government
would encourage Batswana professionals to stay and work in the coun-
try. Presently, the national economy does not have the capacity to
absorb all graduates. The new thinking among educated youths is that
the only other viable options are self-employment and international
employment. The educated population in Botswana is becoming
increasingly aware of its need to maximize its international marketabili-
ty. The emigration option, consequently, has become increasingly popu-
lar in student discourse and thinking. 
The government could institute a programme to encourage profes-
sionals now working in developed countries to return home. It could
Table 2.5: Student Opinions about Botswana Government Policies
Justified (%) Neither (%) Unjustified (%)
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Require citizens to 59.9 57.5 10.4 8.2 29.7 34.3
complete some form 
of national/public 
service before enroll-
ing at institutions of 
higher learning
Require citizens who 57.7 57.9 9.3 9.3 33.0 32.8
have received gov-
ernment bursaries 
for education to 
complete some form 
of national service
Require citizens to 52.1 43.9 10.1 11.1 37.8 45.0
work in Lesotho for 
several years after 
completion of their 
education
N = 1,201
also revert to the impractical pre-1990 policy of assuring full employ-
ment for citizen graduates. The question is: would the cost of this out-
weigh the socioeconomic benefits of skill retention? The answer must
be negative. Botswana’s economic survival rests heavily on the dictates
of the global economy within which reliance on diamonds and beef
exports has fostered international trade links. The benefits of 
globalization necessitate considerable compromise on migration. Even if
immigration of non-citizens was actually a significant factor in 
unemployment and lowered incomes among skilled citizens, it should be
recognized as a small price to pay for sustained national economic 
prosperity.
There is an inher ent problem with the rate of professional progres-
sion in Botswana, stemming from a conflict between exaggerated 
aspirations and reality. There is a widespread belief in the existence of
unlimited job opportunities at senior professional levels for skilled 
citizens who can easily displace expatriates. However, most expatriates
are highly experienced and government does not intend to, and nor
should it, localize positions at the expense of production efficiency sim-
ply to appease the growing anti-foreign sentiment in the country. At
the same time, these sentiments should not remain unchecked. If the
government wishes to retain its emphasis on importing needed skills, it
needs to explain to citizens why this continues to be necessary.27
STAT E S O F VU L N E R A B I L I T Y: TH E FU T U R E BR A I N DR A I N O F TA L E N T T O SO U T H AFR I C A
18
19
CHAPTER 3
THE POTENTIAL BRAIN DRAIN FROM LESOTHO
THUSO GREEN
INTRODUCTION
Lesotho has a long history of supplying unskilled and semi-skilledmigrants to South African mines, towns and farms.28 With theend of apartheid, new job opportunities have opened up inSouth Africa for skilled Basotho. Entry to South Africa is easy
and many are able, though strong family and other connections, to
obtain the necessary employment and residence documentation.29 South
Africa itself takes a relatively relaxed attitude to Basotho working in the
countr y. Despite more general reluctance to hire skilled foreigners, it
has allowed employers to hire people from Lesotho with the requisite
skills. The 2001 Census showed that there were 114,941 Lesotho-born
people in South Africa. 30 Amongst them are growing numbers of skilled
people including teachers, nurses and public servants. Many Basotho
also occupy prominent positions in the South African private and pub-
lic sectors.
F u r ther study is needed of the scope and impact of the brain drain
f rom Lesotho.3 1 One of the key questions is whether the new skilled
migrants are re p roducin g the migrant behaviour of their unskilled coun-
t e r p a rts, using Lesotho as a base for temporary forays into the South
African labour market. Another is what kinds of links skilled pro f e s s i o n-
als  retain with home. Are they s ignificant remitters and investors in
their home country or are they in th e process of cutting economic ties?
A related question is whether Basotho still see South Africa as their
most likely  destination or are they, like professionals in other SADC
countries, now looking further afield, to Europe and North America.
Then there is  the critical policy question of whether the Lesotho gov-
e rnment is investing in skills development for the benefit  of South
Africa. Like every other country faced with temporary or perm a n e n t
emigration of its citizens, Lesotho needs to develop retention and re t u rn
strategies. Finally, there is the related issue of future trends and develop-
ments . What form will the brain drain take in the future? What kinds of
links will migran ts retain with home? Should the government be encour-
aging more immigration to meet skills shortfalls caused by out-migration? 
STUDENT PROFILE IN LESOTHO
The Lesotho survey was carried out at eight institutions in all(Table 3.1). Forty three percent of those interviewed weredoing undergraduate degrees at the National University ofLesotho. Most of the remainder were undertaking certificate
or diploma studies in various sectors include industry, education, health
and agriculture. The majority (92%) were full time students. Nearly
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two-thirds (64%) of those interviewed were female, confirming that
females in Lesotho are generally more likely to progress to tertiary edu-
cation than males. The age range varied from 18 to 52 years, with an
average age of 25. The majority (69%) were still single while about a
quarter (25%) were married. The rest were separated (1%), divorced
(0.9%), abandoned (2%), widowed (2%) or cohabiting (2%). The
mean number of dependents was 3.7, with females having more depend-
ents than males.
The vast majority of students self-identified as members of poorer
economic strata (66% “lower class” and working class). About a quarter
say they are “middle-class.” Higher education is therefore still a poten-
tial route out of poverty for many families. Almost half come from a
rural communal area. Only 12% come from Maseru and the remainder
are from other lar ge or small towns.
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 42
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Table 3.1: Institutions Surveyed in Lesotho
Institution District No.
National University of Lesotho (NUL) Maseru 446
Lesotho College of Education (LCE) Maseru 266
Lerotholi Technical Institute (LTI) Maseru 119
Centre of Accounting Studies (CAS) Maseru 60
National Health Training Centre (NHTC) Maseru 43
Catholic Technical School of Leribe (CTS) Leribe 41
Agricultural College (Leribe campus) (AC) Leribe 32
Institute of Extra Mural Studies (IEMS) Maseru 29
Total 1,129
Table 3.2: Type of sponsorship 
Type of sponsorship No. %
Government bursary (some payment required) 902 79.9
Private/family funds 96 8.5
Government scholarship 71 6.3
University bursary (some payment required) 18 1.6
Technicon bursary (some payment required) 11 1
Private scholarship 9 0.8
University scholarship (no payment pay back required) 8 0.7
Technicon scholarship (no payment pay back required) 7 0.6
Bank/study loan 6 0.5
Tuition waver as member on NUL staff 1 0.1
Total 1,129 100
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Given the general poverty of the population and poor socio-econom-
ic background of many students, it is unsurprising that government is
heavily involved in sponsorship of tertiary education (Table 3.3). As
many as 900 students (79.9%) have government bursaries with condi-
tions attached. Fewer than 100 draw on personal or family funds and
even fewer have bank loans. 
STUDENT ATTITUDES TO EMIGRATION
Students in Lesotho do not make decisions about whether to stayor leave in a vacuum. While the precise numbers of skilled peo-ple who have already left Lesotho are unknown, today’s studentsare certainly very aware, from personal experience, that many
have gone before them. Just over 40% have immediate family members
who have left Lesotho permanently. The figure for those who have
extended family members and friends who have left is as high as 63%.
When it comes to colleagues or co-workers, the findings are equally dra-
matic. Sixty seven percent of students at university and 64% in certifi-
cate or diploma training courses know colleagues or co-workers who
have left the country. Around a third of all students say that “most” or
“almost all” have left the country.
Table 3.3: Type of sponsorship by institution
Type of sponsorship 
Name of institution
CAS NHTC NUL LCE AC CTS LTI IEMS
Government scholarship 4 1 36 17 2 6 3 2
(no payback required)
Government bursary 56 43 396 237 30 4 113 23
(some payback required)
University scholarship 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 3
(no payback required)
University bursary 0 1 6 8 0 0 3 0
(some payback required)
Technicon scholarship 0 0 2 1 0 4 0 0
(no payback required)
Technicon bursary 1 1 0 6 0 1 2 0
(some payback required)
Personal/family funds 8 4 32 19 1 25 9 0
Private scholarship 2 0 3 1 0 2 1 0
Bank/study loan 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1
Tuition waiver NUL staff 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 42
23
As in many other countries of the region, there is a basic tension
between identity and material reality. Like students elsewhere, Basotho
are fiercely nationalistic.32 Over 90% are proud to be called Basotho and
would want their children to feel the same way. But is living in Lesotho
a natural corollary? The majority of students (80%) feel that they have
an important role to play in the future of Lesotho. And over 90%
express a desire to help build Lesotho and feel it their “duty” to con-
tribute their skills and talents to the country. However, as many as 59%
also feel that citizenship does not matter as long as one has a good qual-
ity of life. In other words, loyalty to the idea of being Basotho may be
conditional. How deep does loyalty run? Under what circumstances
would material reality trump idealism and patriotism? What might
induce students to look for a better quality of life elsewhere? 
Since economic circumstances play a major role in the migration
decisions of skilled people, perceptions of personal and national eco-
nomic health are a good starting point. However, nearly three-quarters
of the student body are either strongly dissatisfied or dissatisfied with
their cur rent economic status. Most have a positive outlook on the
future with 68% feeling that in five years their personal economic status
will have improved. The question that is uppermost in their minds is
whether they can realize these dreams within Lesotho or whether leav-
ing the country is a necessary part of improving their circumstances.
How optimistic are students about the general economic future of
Lesotho? Over 90% are dissatisfied with current economic conditions in
the country. Regarding the future, there is an equal split between those
who think that national economic performance will improve and those
who think that it will deteriorate over the next five years. On more spe-
cific measures there tends to be a 2:1 split: future cost of living (45%
worse v 23% better), income levels (44% worse v 27% better), taxation
levels (48% worse v 19% better) and ability to find a desirable job (50%
worse v 28% better) (Table 3.4). Students are a little more optimistic
about their prospects for professional advancement (27% v 36%) and
job security (29% v 39%). They are fairly equally divided on the
prospects for “social” and “safety” issues such as finding a desirable
house, good schools, medical services and family security. However, on
most critical economic measures almost half of Basotho students clearly
believe that conditions will deteriorate in the future. This is a very large
pool of negative sentiment that could potentially also believe that it is
only by leaving the country that a desirable level of employment and
income can be achieved.
The majority of students (75%) think that those who have left
Lesotho permanently are better off than when they were in Lesotho
(Table 3.5). In other words, students do tend to see leaving as a 
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potential way to improve their own quality of life, particularly in light
of the widespread belief that economic conditions in Lesotho itself are
not going to improve. The question is whether the simple act of relocat-
ing will impact positively on quality of life or whether they think this
depends on where they go. 
Table 3.4: Expectations of the Future in Lesotho (%)
Expectation of the Future (%)
Socio-Economic Condition in 5 Ye a r s Better Same Worse
Cost of living 23.3 25.4 45.7
Ability to find the right job 27.7 15.3 50.2
Prospects for professional 33.7 26.5 27.1
advancement
Job Security 39 20.3 28.8
Level of income 27.2 20.5 43.8
Ability to find the right house 29 21.1 39.5
Ability to find a good school for 44.3 22.8 27.3
children
Ability to find medical services for 37.8 23.3 34
family/children
A level of fair taxation 18.8 20.7 48.5
Personal safety 32.7 19.8 37.8
Family’s safety 33.8 20.1 35
Future of children in Lesotho 36.3 18.9 35.2
Quality upkeep of public amenities 23.2 18.9 47.4
Availability of affordable quality 27.7 21.3 42
products
Customer service 29.7 22.4 40.8
N = 1,129
Table 3.5: Impact of Leaving Lesotho on Quality of Life
Quality of life of those who have left Lesotho No. %
Much better 526 50.8
Better 246 23.7
About the same 109 10.5
Worse 35 3.4
Much Worse 22 2.1
Don’t Know 98 9.5
Total 1036 100.0
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Asked to compare the situation in Lesotho with neighbouring
SADC countries and other parts of the world, almost a third say they
have no knowledge of other parts of Africa and some SADC countries
such as Angola and Malawi. Fifteen to twenty percent would not ven-
ture an opinion on North America and Europe. Less than five percent,
however, are unfamiliar with South Africa and Botswana (Table 3.6).
Both of these countries are seen as places that do much better than
Lesotho. Nearly 80% say that Botswana and South Africa are better or
much better than Lesotho. The figures for other countries in SADC are
much lower: for example, Mozambique (15%), Malawi (16%), Zambia
(19%), Zimbabwe (19%), Namibia (25%), and Swaziland (32%). While
Lesotho does not compare favourably with either Europe or North
America in the minds of students, South Africa and Botswana are defi-
nitely also seen as best off in comparison with home.
More than half of the students (57%) say that if they were to leave
Lesotho, they would prefer to live in South Africa. Nearly a third
(31%) believe that they will end up in South Africa. This is followed by
Table 3.6: Comparison of Lesotho and Other Countries
Better or Worse Much Better Better About the Worse Much Don’t 
than Lesotho (%) same Worse know
Botswana 42.6 36.2 13.8 2.6 1.1 3.8
Mozambique 4.0 11.4 27.3 24.6 14.4 18.3
Namibia 5.4 19.3 33.3 14.1 5.1 22.7
Swaziland 8.2 23.4 40.5 11.8 4.7 11.3
Zimbabwe 6.6 12.0 17.6 22.5 26.3 15
South Africa 43.1 33.9 12.3 3.5 2.7 4.6
Angola 5.0 16.0 27.9 13.7 8.8 28.6
Malawi 3.9 11.8 27.9 17.0 9.7 29.8
Zambia 3.8 15.0 29.1 13.5 8.2 30.4
East Africa 5.2 15.9 23.0 14.4 8.0 33.5
West Africa 4.3 18.0 23.8 12.9 7.0 33.7
Central Africa 6.4 17.3 21.7 13.1 9.0 32.3
North Africa 9.2 21.5 20.8 10.2 5.8 32.1
Europe 53.7 15.8 8.7 3.9 3.5 14.4
North America 51.5 18.7 7.5 4.7 4.0 13.5
Australia/ 43.7 22.2 10.0 4.2 3.1 16.8
New Zealand
Asia/China 29.6 22.7 11.1 8.7 10.2 17.6
N = 1,129
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those who say they will most likely go to Botswana (25%), the United
Kingdom (10%), Europe (9%) and the United State of America (7%).
While the emigration horizons of Basotho students seem to be lifting,
the majority are still not looking beyond a future in South Africa.
Opinions about countries such as South Africa are based primarily
on personal experience. Over 80% of students travel to another country
in Southern Africa at least once or twice a year (35% more than once a
month) (Table 3.7). Travel experience of other parts of Africa and else-
where is extremely limited. Data from other SAMP studies suggests that
a large majority of people from Lesotho travel to South Africa for a
variety of reasons but mainly for shopping, school and medical servic-
es.33 Visits to other par ts of the world are very limited for all but a few
respondents. 
How likely are today’s Basotho students to follow their unskilled
counterparts out of the country? The survey found that 43% of respon-
dents have given moving to another country a great deal of considera-
tion while another (34%) have given it some consideration. Only 18%
have not considered it at all. Given that there is an acute shortage of
nurses in Lesotho, it is a great concern that 76% of final-year students
at the National Health Training Centre are considering leaving. While
consideration of leaving is an important first-step, likelihood of doing so
is a more accurate measure of intentions. Over a third (35%) of the stu-
dents said it was likely or very likely they would leave within six
months of graduation (rising to 56% within two years of graduation). 
Students were asked for the three most important reasons why they
Table 3.7: Travel Experience Outside Lesotho
Frequency Southern Elsewhere Europe North Australia/ Asia
Africa in Africa (%) America New Zea- (%)
(%) (%) (%) land (%)
More than once a 34.7 2.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.7
month
Once a month 14.6 3.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Once every few 22.0 4.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5
months
Once or twice a year 10.1 8.3 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.6
Once every few 6.7 10.7 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.5
years
Just once or twice 5.6 11.7 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.4
Never 6.3 59.0 95.2 97.3 97.8 97.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N = 1,129
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might actually leave. The most popular reasons were job security (men-
tioned by 23%), finding a suitable job (21%), cost of living (21%) and
prospects for professional advancement (8%). Interestingly, only 2%
mentioned income and 2% taxation levels as a reason to leave. These
two factors were only marginally more important as second and third
choice reasons for leaving. Job security and finding the right job were
the most important reasons overall (Table 3.8) with income even rating
below ability to find the right house, children’s schooling, family safety
and the HIV/AIDS situation. In sum, Basotho students seem more con-
cerned about secure employment than levels of income per se. Given
the volatile nature of the Lesotho labour market, this is perhaps not all
that surprising.
More than half the students (56%) think the cost of living is much
better or better in their Most Likely Destination (MLD) than in
Lesotho. When it comes to finding the right job, 56% say that they
have a much better or better chance in the MLD than in Lesotho.
Prospects for job advancement are also said to be much better than in
Lesotho by 62% of students. Similarly, job security is thought to be
much better in the MLD than in Lesotho. A large proportion (61%)
feel that the level of income in the MLD is better than in Lesotho. A
very small proportion (16%) think that the chance to get a good school
Table 3.8: Major Reason for Leaving Lesotho
Reasons % of responses
Job security 17.4
Ability to find the right job 12.5
Cost of living 9.9
Prospects for professional advancement 8.9
Ability to find the right house 8.8
Family safety 5.7
Ability to find a good school for children 5.3
HIV/AIDS situation 4.8
Personal safety 4.6
Level of income 4.4
Quality upkeep of public amenities 3.9
Your fair level of taxation 3.1
Ability to find medical services for children 2.7
Availability of affordable quality production 2.7
The future of children in Lesotho 2.5
Customer service 0.1
for children is better in Lesotho than in the MLD. This is in line with
the general experience where most Basotho send their children to
schools in South Africa (the MLD of choice). Students have the same
attitude to medical services.
The usual “stick” factors that might deter someone from leaving are
much less powerful in the case of Basotho students, partly because their
intended destination is so close and well-known to them already. On
the other hand, getting legal papers to work in South Africa has not
been easy for anyone since 1994, Basotho included.34 Opinion is mixed.
Forty five percent say it would be easy to work in their most likely desti-
nation; 47% that it would be difficult. 
Families can either facilitate or discourage migration. Nearly half of
the students (47%) indicate their families would encourage them to
leave Lesotho. Only a third say they would be discouraged from leaving.
Regardless of family influence, the majority (70%) indicate the final
decision would be made by them. Only 10% say the decision would be
made by their spouses or parents. 
How long would students stay away for? Would their emigration be
temporary or permanent? Seventy percent say they want to leave for
longer than two years. Forty three percent indicate that if they left they
would stay away for longer than five years (Table 3.9). Nearly sixty per-
cent of students have a strong desire to become permanent residents in
their MLD. Nearly fifty percent say they would want to become citizens
of their MLD. In sum, there is considerable interest amongst Basotho
students in leaving Lesotho permanently and re-settling elsewhere.
Would this prevent them maintaining linkages with home? From Table
3.10, it is clear that most would not be willing to break all ties.
Asked how often they would want to return home, a large number
(54%) say they would do so once at least once every few months. They
would also be serious remitters. As many as 64% say they would send
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Table 3.9: Intended Length of Stay in MLD
Period of stay in MLD % Cumulative %
Less than 6 months 6.7 6.7
6 months to one year 5.6 12.3
1 to 2 years 14.0 26.3
2 to 5 years 22.1 48.4
More than 5 years 43.3 91.7
Don’t know 7.2 98.9
No response 1.1 100.0
Total 100.0 N = 1,083
money home once a month. Very few indicated that they would never
remit.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
What might government do to address the impending skillsloss crisis? How would students respond to various possi-ble policy measures to encourage or require them to stayin the country? More than half (54%) think it would be
justified to require citizens to complete some form of national/public
service before enrolling at institutions of higher learning (Table 3.11).
An even larger proportion (71%) think that it would be justified to
require citizens who have received government bursaries for education
to complete some form of national service. There is also a general con-
sensus that it would be justifiable to require citizens to work in the
country for several years after completion of their education. 
Table 3.12 suggests that changes in policy would not make a diff e r-
ence to the likelihood of emigration. Most (85%) think that enacting
legislation which will make it more difficult for students to migrate would
not discourage people from leaving Lesotho. In sum, the usual re t e n t i o n
strategies would make very lit t le diff e rence if implemented in Lesotho.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, a large number of students are ready and willing toleave Lesotho on graduation. Given the fact that most stu-dents are funded out of the public purse, this is a reason forgrave concern. The Lesotho government invests in training
and South Africa is the primary beneficiary. Without major economic
growth in Lesotho, the brain drain is probably unstoppable. The best
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Table 3.10: Willingness to Cut Ties with Lesotho
Response (%) Give up home Take all Take all assets Give up citizen-
in Lesotho possessions out out of Lesotho ship of Lesotho
of Lesotho
Very Willing 12.9 7.0 7.9 9.8
Willing 15.2 10.6 8.1 8.6
Unwilling 33.7 36.5 33.9 23.0
Very Unwilling 35.6 42.0 45.7 52.6
Don’t know 2.6 3.9 4.4 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N = 1,146 N = 1,131 N = 1,126 N = 1,106
that can be hoped for is that the new Basotho migrants will remit as
regularly and as voluminously as the mine migrants of previous genera-
tions (many of whom would have been their own relatives). Lesotho
government policies have to adapt to the new migration reality.
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Table 3.11: Student Opinion About Lesotho Government Policies
Response (%)
Completely Justified Neither Unjustified Completely Don’t 
Justified Unjustified know
Require citizens to 26.6 27.3 4.8 24.2 9.4 7.6
complete some form 
of national/public 
service before 
enrolling at 
institutions of higher 
learning
Require citizens who 37.4 33.4 6.7 13.7 5.5 3.4
have received gov- 
ernment bursaries 
for education to 
complete some form 
of national service
Require citizens to 33.6 25.0 6.5 19.3 13.8 1.8
work in Lesotho for 
several years after 
completion of their 
education
Table 3.12: Student Responses to Possible Restrictions 
Probability of Much more More No differ- Less Much less Don’t 
Emigration if likely (%) likely (%) ence (%) likely (%) likely (%) know (%)
Government:
Took steps to make it 12.4 15.2 34.7 16.3 10.0 11.4
more difficult to 
emigrate
Required people 11.5 19.9 34.9 15.0 9.3 9.5
leaving professional 
schools to do one 
year national service 
in their area of 
expertise
Allowed people to 11.5 14.8 37.3 14.5 12.6 9.4
hold only one 
passport
Increased fees for 9.7 11.6 37.3 16.4 14.2 10.9
emigration 
documents
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CHAPTER 4
THE POTENTIAL BRAIN DRAIN FROM SWAZILAND
HAMILTON SIMELANE
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INTRODUCTION
Swaziland, like Lesotho, has a long history of circulatory labourmigration with South Africa.35 Between 1911 and 1985, thenumber of Swazi migrants in South Africa remained remarkablystable over time. The 1929 South African Census, for example,
recorded 29,177 Swaziland-born people in the country. The equivalent
figure sixty years later, in 1985, was 30,772.36 For decades, migrants were
primarily unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the mines, farms and
households of white South Africa. More recently, and par ticularly since
the collapse of apartheid, skilled Swazis have found it much easier to
move and live and work in South Africa.37 In 2001, the number of
Swaziland-born people in South Africa had increased to 34,471.38 Many
of these individuals are part of a new wave of migration to South Africa
of teachers, nurses, civil servants and academics.
The numbers involved are not known with any certainty but they
will almost certainly grow in the future. As the Swazi economy stumbles
and the political problems increase, so too do the attractions of moving
to South Africa. In addition, new South African immigration legisla-
tion will make it much easier for skilled Swazis to migrate legally to
South Africa in the future.
One index of whether the brain trickle is likely to escalate into a
full-fledged brain drain in the future lies in the heads of the next gener-
ation of skilled Swazis. With that in mind, the PSBS was implemented
in Swaziland to try and get a better reading of whether Swazi students
still feel that their own country offers them a future or whether they,
like students in other parts of the r egion, are also eyeing the possibility
of moving to greener pastures in South Africa and elsewhere. 
STUDENT PROFILE IN SWAZILAND
This chapter is based on the findings of a survey of 1,197 finalyear college and university students. Some 53% of the samplewere pursuing certificate and diploma programmes while 36%were enrolled for Bachelor’s degrees. A random sample of stu-
dents some years ago in Swaziland would have yielded a predominantly
male population. Today, that imbalance has been largely rectified. Of
the students interviewed in this project, 48.5% were female. The vast
majority (87.3%) of the students were single, with only one in ten mar-
ried. Half the students say that they have no dependents. Family obliga-
tions are therefore unlikely to create barriers to movement. A third of
the students (36%) identify themselves as of middle-class background,
with the remainder “lower class” (34%) or working class (26%). The
high percentage of students from poorer backgrounds speaks well of the
accessibility of education in Swaziland. The absolute number of middle-
class students in tertiary education is probably much higher since many
from the middle-class actually leave the country to study.
Government is heavily involved in student support in Swaziland
with over 80% on state bursaries (Table 4.1). Institutional scholarships
and bursaries are all but non-existent. Only 15.5% of students draw on
personal or family funds.
The strength of Swaziland’s migration ties with South Africa are
reflected in the studen ts’ own life experience. Ve ry few ( less than 5%)
have ever travelled to Europe, North America or Asia. On the other
hand, only 10% have never been to South Africa (Table 4.2). Nearly
20% go to South Africa at least  once a month and over 70% at least
once a year. Most of their travels  to South  Africa to date have been non
w o r k - related. When they go there after graduation  to look for employ-
ment, they will not be doing so as complete novices. Swazis know South
Africa well and it  is the most obvious place to go when leaving home.
Just over 40% of the students have immediate family members who
have already emigrated from Swaziland, but only 10% say that most or
almost all have left permanently (Table 4.3). The fact that over 50%
have no family members who have left is instructive, if only because it
indicates that there are still a large number of individual families in the
country who have not yet been touched by the brain drain. That 
situation could change rapidly if this cohort of students acts on its
intentions. Broadening the circle to include extended family members
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Table 4.1: Sources of Student Support
Form of Support No. %
Government scholarship (no payback required) 91 8.8
Government bursary (some payback required) 767 74.4
University scholarship (no payback required) 5 0.5
University bursary (some payback required) 10 1.0
Technicon scholarship (no payback required) 1 0.1
Technicon bursary (some payback required) 4 0.4
Personal / family funds 160 15.5
Private scholarship 28 2.7
Bank / study loan 6 0.6
Other 8 0.8
Don’t know 5 0.5
Totals 1031 100.0
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and friends, a slightly different picture emerges. Here only 25% of stu-
dents report that no members of the extended family have left the
country. Very similar figures were reported for close friends. Around
20% of students say that most or almost all of their close friends have
already gone. The final category included colleagues, fellow students
and co-workers; in other words, educated and trained people like them-
selves. Here, only 20% do not know of anyone who has left. This sug-
gests that the brain drain of skilled Swazis is not a future possibility but
an ongoing reality.
STUDENT ATTITUDES TO EMIGRATION
Swazi are often cited for a strong sense of national identity.Allegiance to the monarchy and traditional cultural practicesare seen as important indicators of Swazi identity. At the sametime the schism between the traditional and the modern has
widened in Swaziland in recent years. The University campus has been
Table 4.2: Frequency of Swazi Student Travel to South Africa
No. %
More than once a month 115 9.7
Once a month 88 7.4
Once every few months 346 29.1
Once or twice a year 307 25.9
Once every few years 112 9.4
Just once or twice 97 8.2
Never 122 10.3
Total 1187 100.0
Table 4.3: Knowledge of People Who Have Left Swaziland
Immediate Family Extended Family Close Friends Colleagues / 
Fellow Students / 
Co-workers
No. % No. % No. % No. %
None 613 51.9 298 25.4 347 26.6 241 20.5
Just One or Tw o 290 24.5 245 20.9 248 21.2 167 14.2
Several 155 13.1 307 26.1 295 25.2 374 31.8
Most 54 4.6 159 13.6 147 12.6 163 13.8
Almost all 39 3.3 68 5.8 61 5.2 66 5.6
Don’t know 31 2.6 97 8.3 72 6.1 166 14.1
Total 1,182 100.0 1,175 100.0 1,170 100.0 1,176 100.0
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a recurrent site of anti-government and anti-royal opposition and
protest. The question then is to what extent students still hold a strong
sense of Swazi identity in a nation undergoing unprecedented, though
largely hidden, stress and conflict. The fact that so many students are
from rural backgrounds, where traditional powers and mores are still
strong, might reasonably be expected to influence the answer to this
question.
Interestingly, about 70% of the students say they are proud to be
called Swazi while only 14% say they are not. Asked whether being a
citizen of Swaziland is an important part of how they see themselves,
60% answered positively while 18% responded negatively and 18%
were undecided. These numbers seem fairly unequivocal yet it is worth
noting, in passing, that the degree of identification is weaker than in
countries such as Lesotho or Botswana where the percentage of “proud”
students is much higher. Like students in Botswana and Lesotho, Swazis
are also idealistic. An overwhelming 85% say they feel it is their duty to
contribute their skills and talents to the country and that they also have
a definite contribution to make in the development of Swaziland. This
would certainly seem to indicate that given the right conditions and
environment, Swazi students would prefer to remain in Swaziland and
contribute their skills to the growth and development of their country.
Economic conditions at both the personal and national levels can
play an important role in influencing decisions about migration. At the
personal level, economic conditions can make the process of self-repro-
duction extremely difficult, making the potential for out-migration
high. Three quarters of Swazi students express dissatisfaction with their
current economic situation. However, dissatisfaction has nothing obvi-
ous to do with socio-economic background. In other words, those who
are satisfied are not necessarily middle-class and not all those from poor-
er backgrounds are dissatisfied. Students worldwide are notoriously, and
rightly, dissatisfied with their economic circumstances. Swazi students,
however, are also extremely negative about the performance of the
national economy with a dissatisfaction rate of 87% (and approval rate
of only 3%). 
What of the future? The majority of students (66%) expect their
personal fortunes to have improved five years hence. However, 77% feel
that the national economic situation will be worse. Perhaps this appar-
ent contradiction is simply the opinion of the classic “impoverished”
student or perhaps the students are thinking that their own fortunes are
not necessarily tied to those of the national economy. Swaziland will be
worse off economically in five years time but this will not affect them
personally because they will be seeking their fortunes elsewhere. This
hypothesis tends to be born out by evidence from the survey.
Interestingly, male students were more optimistic than females about
their personal economic future. The higher negative response from
females may be a reflection of the fact that students are perfectly aware
that Swazi women continue to bear the brunt of poverty in Swaziland
and find it more difficult to access jobs than men. It could also be a
function of the fact that they see themselves as less mobile than men,
although this is not confirmed in the survey as a whole. 
The general gloom about the national economy and its prospects is
echoed in r esponses to questions about what this would mean for them
personally. Over 80% feel that the cost of living will get worse, for
example. There is a significant difference here between rural and urban
responses, with rural dwellers more pessimistic. Eighty percent feel that
their ability to find the job they want will decline over the next 5 years.
Only 12% and 25% respectively feel that job security and opportunities
for professional advancement will improve. There is a little more opti-
mism about income with 31% feeling that income levels will improve
over the next five years. On the other hand, only 6% feel that income
tax will be better in the future. On most of these measures, females were
more pessimistic than males.
Swaziland is in the grip of a devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic which
is cutting a swath through the education and health sectors.39 Both sec-
tors are also feeling the pinch of the brain drain to South Africa.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Swazi students are not at all optimistic about
future service in these two sectors. Only 31% feel that medical services
will improve in the next five years (46% think they will deteriorate).
Similarly with schools, 35% think the situation will improve, 40% that
it will get worse. Students are also not enamoured with the safety and
security situation in Swaziland with over 60% thinking that the threat
to personal and family security will increase. Similar numbers (63%)
have no confidence in Swaziland as a place to secure their children’s
future. 
If students perceive that conditions at home, however bad, are no
better than in other countries, they will have little interest in moving.
But Swazi students in overwhelming numbers do believe that things are
better in at least some parts of the world than in Swaziland. For exam-
ple, the majority feel that they would be better off in Europe (80%),
North America (77%), Australia/New Zealand (71%) and Asia (56%).
In the case of Southern African countries, South Africa (85%) and
Botswana (66%) are cited as better than Swaziland. Mozambique and
Zimbabwe rate poorly amongst most students. All students, male and
female, arts and sciences, rural and urban, have a more positive view of
South Africa than they do of any other part of the region or world.
If Swazi students had no restrictions on where they could move to if
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they left, most (43%) say they would opt for South Africa and
Botswana. Twenty nine percent say Europe and 18% North America.
Students have virtually no interest in Asia (3%) and the rest of Africa
(1%). What makes South Africa and Europe and North America so
attractive looking? What is it about their Most Likely Destination
(MLD) that is most attractive to Swazi students? Table 4.4 shows the
number of students who think a particular economic or social measure
would be better in their MLD than in Swaziland. Economically, the
majority of students think that Swaziland compares unfavourably with
their MLD. The contrast is particularly marked in relation to income,
prospects for professional advancement and ability to find the right job.
On most social measures (including health), Swaziland also comes off
worse. Only in the case of personal and family safety issues do slightly
fewer than half of the students believe that the situation is better in
their MLD. In the case of HIV/AIDS, around half think the situation is
better in their MLD. The fact that so many students see South Africa as
their MLD obviously affects their perception of safety issues. On the
other hand, South Africa is clearly seen as superior on just about every
other economic and social measure used in the survey.
Which of these factors is likely to exercise the strongest pull on stu-
dents? While it is important to recognize that any migration decision is
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Table 4.4: Comparison of Swaziland with MLD
Better in the Most Likely Destination: No. (%)
Economic
Level of Income 850 93.8
Right Job 626 70.1
Professional advancement 758 85.5
Cost of Living 528 58.1
Job Security 534 67.1
Taxation Level 413 57.1
Social
HIV / AIDS Situation 396 50.6
Children’s future 489 59.1
Children’s Schooling 675 77.5
Family Safety 380 47.6
Medial Care 707 82.4
Personal Safety 398 48.9
Housing 625 75.4
Public Amenities 717 85.9
complex and cannot be reduced to a single reason, students were asked
to provide the single most important reason why they might leave.
Table 4.5 shows that economic/employment considerations are actually
far more important than social (including health) differences when it
comes to migration decisions. Less than 5% mentioned social factors as
a primary reason for leaving. Even the HIV/AIDS epidemic is not, in
itself, considered to be a strong reason for going. Income and an inabili-
ty to find the “right” job in Swaziland are easily the most important rea-
sons for leaving. Other factors – cost of living, job security and taxes –
are much less significant.
While there are many reasons why people might leave, it usually
involves some calculation and comparison of conditions here and con-
ditions there. As we have seen, economic rather than social factors are
paramount in the thinking of Swazis. On the other hand, there are usu-
ally a host of “stick” factors making an early exit less likely. These often
relate to social issues such as family obligations and preferences. Other
SAMP research has shown that gender, cross-cutting with race and
occupation, is also an important determinant of emigration potential
amongst seasoned professionals.40 Because many Swazi are very family-
oriented it is important to see how much decision-making autonomy
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Table 4.5: Most Important Reason for Leaving Swaziland 
No. %
Economic
Level of Income 279 33.4
Right Job 256 30.7
Professional Advancement 124 14.9
Cost of Living 84 10.0
Job Security 24 2.8
Taxation Level 13 1.5
Social
HIV AIDS Situation 15 1.7
Children’s future 9 1.1
Children’s Schooling 7 0.9
Family Safety 6 0.8
Medical Care 6 0.8
Personal Safety 5 0.6
Housing 4 0.5
Public Amenities 1 0.1
Total 833 100.0
students feel they have and whether their families think it would be a
good idea for them to leave. 
Swazi families are perhaps not quite as encouraging of emigration as
Basotho families but only 30% of students say that they would be dis-
couraged from leaving. More (39%) say that their departure would be
encouraged. Contrary to expectations, more women (249) than men
(212) say their families would encourage them to leave. Historically,
Swazi families have tended to discourage female migration using a vari-
ety of reasons to justify their position. That is why in most migration
streams from Swaziland in the past there have been limited numbers of
women.41 But these are different times. Education, and the fact that
some young women are now breadwinners for their families, have
engendered a new attitude. Families have been forced to accept that
because of the skills they now possess, daughters can migrate with the
same intensity and positive impacts as sons. Regardless of whether the
family puts up obstacles or encourages emigration, the majority of stu-
dents (67%) say the decision is up to them. Only 18% say their parents
would decide for them. Times have clearly changed.
The pre-conditions for an accelerating brain drain appear to be in
place. Swazi students are prepped to look beyond the borders of the
country, perhaps unlike any other moment in Swazi history. And the
people who leave will be those whose skills and dedication is most
needed at home. What, then, are the emigration intentions of today’s
student at the university and technical colleges? The majority of stu-
dents have certainly thought about leaving. But how likely is it that
they will actually do so? As many as 62% say it is likely (33%) or very
likely (28%) that they will leave for a period of more than two years
(Table 4.6).
Confirming not only the high rate of likely departure but the pen-
chant for an extended period away, only 20% say they would want to
stay in their MLD for less than two years (Table 4.7). A massive 44%
say they would want to stay away for more than five years. Whether
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Table 4.6: Likelihood of Leaving Swaziland for More than Two Years
No. %
Very likely 301 28.4
Likely 351 33.1
Unlikely 202 19.1
Very unlikely 104 9.9
Do not know 101 9.5
Total 1060 100.0
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they will all actually do so is, of course, debatable but it is clear that the
potential move to South Africa is not seen as a short-term palliative but
a longer-term commitment.
Moving to South Africa does not mean cutting ties with Swaziland.
On the contrary, once relocated only 4% say they would never return.
Twenty percent would return at least once a month and over 80%
would return at least once a year. Less than two percent say they would
never send money home. Seventy six per cent say they would remit at
lease once a month and a further 16% “a few times a year.” The loss of
newly minted skills is a serious problem, partially offset by the fact that
so many Swazi would remit funds home once they had left.
The desir e to retain str ong backward linkages after departure is con-
firmed by other measures. Just 23% say that they have a strong wish to
become permanent residents of another country. However, only 22% say
they have no desir e suggesting that the question remains an open one
for the majority. Similarly, 24% have a strong desire to become citizens
of another country and 24% have no desire at all. On the other hand,
70% have no desire to be buried in another country, suggesting that
eventual return to Swaziland is anticipated. The attachment to
Swaziland is further demonstrated by a reluctance to give up a home in
Swaziland (75% unwilling) and Swazi citizenship (73% unwilling).
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
The Swaziland government has shown little public concernabout the brain drain to South Africa to date. If and when itdoes, it is likely to consider the same set of measures adoptedby other governments faced with a crippling skills loss. How
would Swazi students respond to such measures? First, 40% say that gov-
ernment steps to make emigration difficult would have no impact on
their decision to move fr om Swaziland. Twenty one percent say it would
Table 4.7: Desired Length of Stay in MLD
No. %
Less than 6 months 30 2.6
6 months to one year 59 5.0
1 to 2 years 141 12.0
2 to 5 years 313 26.6
More than 5 years 514 43.7
Do not know 118 10.0
Total 1176 100.0
make them more likely to emigrate and 19% that it would make them
less likely. In other words, the majority of Swazi students feel that gov-
ernment interventions would not deter or inhibit them from leaving.
On specific measures that government might take, 47% are opposed
and 38% in favour of some form of national/public service before
enrolling at institutions of higher learning. Bonding is one policy option
pursued by many African governments. Here, nationals are required to
work in the country for a specified number of years after completion of
their training. About 50% of Swazi students disagree with bonding,
with 36% saying it would be justified. Half of the respondents feel that
out-migration would be reduced if positive measures were introduced by
government to encourage the return of qualified professionals, while
33% feel that such measures would not change the situation. Swazi stu-
dents also feel that measures to discourage destination countries from
employing emigrants from Swaziland will not reduce emigration.
Economic policies were seen as having a much greater potential impact
than political interventions. Some 83% feel that only greater local eco-
nomic development would reduce out-migration. 
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CHAPTER 5
THE POTENTIAL BRAIN DRAIN FROM NAMIBIA
SELMA NANGULAH
INTRODUCTION
Prior to independence in 1990, few institutions provided tertiaryeducation for Namibians. 42 The apartheid regime had littleinterest in educating the mass of the Namibian populationbeyond the most rudimentary levels. It is only over the last
decade that the Namibian government has invested resources to pro-
vide tertiary educational opportunities for citizens in order to meet the
skills requirements of the public and private sector. If many of these
newly trained professionals now decide to leave Namibia, it could create
a serious problem for the country.
Namibia does not have the long and entrenched history of mass
migration to South Africa that characterizes the other countries studied
in this publication. A previous SAMP study in 1998 found few
Namibians who wanted to emigrate to South Africa.43 However, there
have been recent media reports in Namibia of growing numbers of
Namibian health professionals moving to developed countries.44 This at
least suggests that Namibia is coming under the same sorts of pressure as
other countries in SADC to yield up its professionals to the regional
and global skills market. One of the more obvious and convenient
places to go would be South Africa. No research has been conducted on
the propensity of skilled Namibians to leave for South Africa. This
study is the first attempt to investigate the likelihood of brain drain
depletion of Namibia’s future skills base.
STUDENT PROFILE IN NAMIBIA
The PSBS study was carried out among students from 10 terti-ary educational institutions in Namibia. A total of 1,200 stu-dents were interviewed. Eighty percent of the interviews wereconducted in Windhoek, the capital city. There were slightly
more male (52%) than female students (48%) and the majority (63%)
were young (23 years or less). As many as 91% of the students were sin-
gle. Almost half (47%) were from the r ural communal areas, while 25%
came from small towns. Very few came from a city (14%), large town
(10%) or the commercial farming areas (5%). Around one in ten saw
themselves as upper middle to upper class (9%). Twenty eight percent
said they were middle class and the remainder working-class and “lower-
class.” 
Most language groups were represented at about the same ratio as in
the national population (Figure 5.1). Oshiwambo-speaking students (at
46%) made up the majority of respondents, followed by Lozi speakers
(11%) and Damara/Nama (10%). Otjiherero and Rukwangali-speaking
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students were 7% and 9%, respectively; Afrikaans speakers made up 8%
and English speakers 4%. 
The students were drawn from ten separate institutions with the
majority (66.7%) from the University of Namibia (Table 5.1). They
represented a broad cross-section of faculties and disciplines from educa-
tion (40%), technical courses (22%), science (13%), arts/social sci-
ences/humanities (7%) and commerce and business (7%). The sample
also included 44 students in medicine/pharmacy. Most students were
enrolled full-time. Forty four percent were studying for Bachelor’s
degrees and 56% for certificates or diplomas. Only Namibian citizens
and students with permanent residence were interviewed. 
Figure 5.1: The home language breakdown of respondents
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Table 5.1: Tertiary Institutions Sampled
Institution No. %
University of Namibia 801 66.7
Polytechnic of Namibia 207 17.2
Ongwediva College of Education 64 5.3
Windhoek College of Education 37 3.1
Rundu College of Education 27 2.3
Rundu Vocational Training Centre 20 1.6
Windhoek Vocational Training Centre 18 1.5
Valombola Vocational Training Centre 14 1.2
Ogongo Agricultural College 5 0.5
Neudamm Agricultural College 6 0.5
Total 1199 100
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Financial support for tertiary education in Namibia comes from a
variety of sources. 40% of students are on government bursaries or
scholarships (with 33% requiring some form of payback) (Table 5.3).
Table 5.2: Sample by Institution/Programme
Faculty No. %
University: Faculty of Engineering 9 0.8
University: Faculty of Medicine/Pharmacy 44 3.7
University: Faculty of Science 156 13
University: Faculty of Arts/Social Science and Humanities 87 7.3
University: Faculty of Law 17 1.4
University: Faculty of Commerce/Business 78 6.5
University: Faculty of Computer Science/IT 11 0.9
University: Faculty of Agriculture 36 3
University: Other 2 0.2
University: Faculty of Education 354 29.6
Technical College/Technicon: Technical Subjects 129 10.8
Technical College/Technicon: Commerce/Administration 98 8.2
Technical College/Technicon: IT/Computers 9 0.7
Technical College/Technicon: Other 23 1.9
Teacher Training College 129 10.7
Agricultural Training College 11 0.9
Total 1,184 100
Table 5.3: Sources of Student Financial Support in Namibia
Sources of support for study training No. %
Government scholarship (no payback required) 70 5.3
Government bursary (some payback required) 438 32.7
University scholarship (no payback required) 9 0.7
University bursary (some payback required) 17 1.2
Technicon scholarship (no payback required) 1 0.1
Technicon bursary (some payback required) 7 0.5
Personal family funds 459 34.3
Private scholarship 127 9.5
Bank/study loan 200 14.9
Other sources 7 0.6
Don’t know 4 0.3
Total 1339* 100
*N >1,200 as some students have more than one source of funding
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Other significant sources of funding include private monies (34% of stu-
dents), bank loans (15%) and private scholarships (10%). About a third
of the students say they are required to work in the public sector as a
form of payback, while 11% are required to work for the private sector.
A strong sense of national pride is reported by the students who
show very positive attitudes towards (a) being Namibian, (b) being citi-
zens, and (c) wanting their children to think of themselves as
Namibians. Students from rural backgrounds are marginally more posi-
tive than those of urban origin. Students exhibit a strong desire to help
build Namibia (94% in favour), and believe it their duty to contribute
their talents and skills to the growth of their country (93%). Most
believe that they have a role to play in the future of their country. A
majority (68%) feel that they have an “important role” to play person-
ally, while 24% indicate that they have “some role” to play
Namibian students are far less negative about their personal and
national economic circumstances than those from the other countries
considered her e. Only 27% are dissatisfied with their own circumstances
and 22% with national economic conditions. They are also far more
optimistic about the future. Nearly 80% of the students believe that
their economic condition and that of the country will improve over the
next five years.
However, there are mixed feelings among students about particular
economic indicators (Table 5.4). About the same number think that
the cost of living will improve and that it will get worse. They are simi-
larly divided about whether they can get the job they want. More think
that their earnings will be significantly greater and that job security will
improve. They would, however, expect to be paying higher taxes, pre-
sumably to pay for what they predict as an improvement in healthcare,
schooling and public amenities. Again, students from rural backgrounds
are more optimistic about the future than those from urban back-
grounds.
Students were asked to compare Namibia with other countries.
South Africa is the only country in Southern Africa which the majority
of students (71%) think is “better off” than Namibia. South Africa
compares favourably with Europe and North America in the eyes of
Namibian students (Table 5.5). A number of countries are seen as no
better or worse off than Namibia. Only in the case of Zimbabwe, how-
ever, do a clear majority of students consider themselves to be better off
in Namibia.
As noted above, Namibia does not have a strong tradition of emigra-
tion. This is reflected in the fact that, in contrast to Lesotho and
Swaziland for example, most students are not aware of many people who
have left the country permanently (Table 5.6). However, the more the
sphere of questioning is expanded from the immediate family, the high-
er the number of people known to have left the country.
Namibian students also have very limited personal travel experience.
Although there has been very little travel among students outside
Namibia, some 41% have traveled to countries within Southern Africa,
most only occasionally. Fewer students have traveled to other parts of
the world. 
Given their high levels of commitment to their country, relative sat-
isfaction with life and future prospects, and the fact that they have lim-
ited personal or vicarious exposure to life outside Namibia, it would be
surprising to find that many Namibian students are inter ested in leaving
after graduation. However, this is far from the case. 
A total of 29% have given a great deal of consideration to leaving
and a further 40% have given it some consideration. Women, urban-
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Table 5.4: Expectations about the Future in Namibia
Response Category Better (%) About the Worse (%) Don’t know
same (%) (%)
Cost of living 41 13 43 2
Ability to find the job I want 36 21 40 3
Prospects for professional 52 22 15 12
advancement
HIV/AIDS situation 20 7 69 3
The security of your job 39 28 20 13
Your level of income 58 20 12 10
Ability to find the house you want 46 20 28 7
to live in
Ability to find a good school for 56 17 21 5
your children
Ability to find medical services for 59 21 17 5
your family and children
A level of fair taxation 22 26 37 15
Your personal safety 40 24 29 6
Your family’s safety 42 25 27 6
The future of your children in 54 18 17 11
Namibia
Quality upkeep of public 52 21 21 6
amenities (e.g. Parks, beaches, 
toilets etc.)
Availability of affordable quality 44 20 28 8
products
Customer service 52 23 15 9
based students, and those from more affluent families have given more
consideration to moving. Only 27% report that they have never
thought of moving at all. 
Thinking about moving is not the same thing as thinking it is likely
to happen. Nearly thirty percent of the students think it is likely or very
likely that they will be gone within six months of graduation. The pro-
portion rises to 47% within two years and 58% within five years. What
this seems to confirm is that there is a sizable minority (perhaps a third)
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Table 5.5: Comparison Between Namibia and Other Countries
Countries Much Better Better (%) About the Worse (%) Much Don’t 
(%) same (%) worse (%) know (%)
Botswana 12 26 34 13 4 11
Lesotho 5 22 34 18 4 18
Mozambique 2 15 32 27 8 17
Swaziland 7 22 34 16 5 16
Zimbabwe 3 12 23 28 24 10
South Africa 30 41 17 5 2 6
Angola 9 19 20 25 15 11
Malawi 3 16 27 27 7 20
Zambia 4 14 26 27 15 14
East Africa 4 17 24 19 11 25
West Africa 5 20 24 19 9 23
Central Africa 4 17 26 21 10 23
North Africa 7 23 22 18 7 23
Europe 44 32 8 5 3 9
North America 41 31 8 6 3 10
Australia / 38 31 11 5 2 14
New Zealand
Asia/China 23 27 16 10 6 18
Table 5.6: Knowledge of People Who Have Left Namibia
No. of people Immediate family Extended family Close friends (%) Fellow students / 
(%) (%) colleagues / 
co-workers (%)
None 69 51 48 39
One – Two 18 21 22 18
Several 7 13 17 19
Most 2 5 5 11
Almost all 4 1 3 4
in Namibia who are interested in leaving and think it likely that they
will do so. Over time, this number may grow.
Only a few students (8%) say they have already applied for a work
permit, with 15% of the students in the process of applying. The rest
(77%) say that they have not applied for work permits elsewhere. Only
a handful of students say that have applied for a permanent resident
permit (4%) or citizenship (4%) in another country.
Although 65 countries are mentioned as most likely destinations by
students, South Africa (26%), the USA (13%) and the UK (12%) are
the most popular. A comparison between Namibia and the MLD should
shed some light on why students think they will probably leave the
country. How does Namibia fare in such comparisons? On most eco-
nomic and social issues, students are fairly evenly split (Table 5.8),
which suggests that only the sizable minority thinks that the grass is
greener on the other side. 
Asked more directly for the most important reason why they would
leave, no single reason stands out. Prospects for professional advance-
ment are mentioned by 20% as the most important reason, while cost of
living, level of income and finding a desirable job are all cited by
approximately 15% of the students. There are few unequivocal clues
here to explain the strong desire to leave amongst the sizable minority.
One possible alternative, non-economic explanation is that students
are being encouraged by their families to leave the country. Here there
is some supporting evidence. As many as 36% of the students are being
encouraged by their families to leave (with only 27% being actively dis-
couraged). Another possible, non-economic influence is the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Almost half of the students indicated that the HIV/AIDS
rate in Namibia might influence their decision to move. Only 27% said
it would have no influence.
What is striking is that even the members of the sizable minority see
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Table 5.7: Likelihood of Leaving Namibia After Graduation
Response Within Six Within Two Within Five 
months years years
No. % No. % No. %
Very likely 127 11 162 14 310 27
Likely 199 17 382 33 357 31
Unlikely 293 26 288 25 163 14
Very unlikely 374 33 195 17 170 15
Do not know 152 13 119 10 148 13
Totals 1,145 100 1,146 100 1,148 100
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Table 5.8: Comparison of Namibia with the MLD
Compa- Much better Better About Better Much better Do not 
risons in Namibia in Namibia the same in MLD in MLD know
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Cost of 236 20 284 24 172 15 266 23 154 13 63 5
living
Ability to 133 12 290 25 218 20 282 24 148 13 88 8
find job 
I want
Prospects 67 6 184 16 187 16 325 28 268 23 121 11
for profes-
sional adv-
ancement
HIV/AIDS 41 4 117 10 306 26 243 21 243 21 214 18
situation
Security of 82 7 287 25 216 19 256 22 168 15 147 13
your job
Your level 59 5 143 13 124 11 388 34 333 29 92 8
of income
Ability to 134 12 291 25 212 18 293 25 261 22 105 9
find a 
house you 
want
Ability to 91 8 195 17 198 17 346 30 253 22 85 7
find good 
school for 
your 
children
Ability to 82 7 229 20 198 17 293 25 261 22 105 9
find 
medical 
services 
for your 
family
A level of 71 6 245 21 277 24 191 16 115 10 264 23
fair 
taxation
Your pers- 154 13 294 26 233 20 210 18 161 14 100 9
onal safety
Your fam- 161 14 327 28 203 18 202 18 144 13 118 10
ily’s safety
The future 148 13 293 25 203 18 190 16 210 18 117 10
of your 
children in 
Namibia
Quality 58 5 156 13 199 17 311 27 334 29 116 10
upkeep of 
public 
amenities
Availability 67 6 150 13 172 15 361 31 302 26 117 10
of afforda-
ble quality
products
Customer 72 6 143 12 204 17 311 27 269 23 175 15
service
emigration as a temporary rather than permanent phenomenon. Very
few students (16%) are willing to stay for less than a year in their MLD,
but rather want to stay for 1 – 2 years (26%), 2 – 5 years (26%) or more
than 5 years (22%). Once they have moved to their MLD, students
indicate that they are likely to return home yearly (40%), every few
months (24%) or every few years (15%). However, most students indi-
cate that they are not ready to become permanent residents or citizens
in their MLD. Retiring or being buried there is out of the question.
Most would also retain str ong linkages with home, being unwilling to
give up their Namibian homes, remove all their assets and possessions
from Namibia or give up Namibian citizenship (Table 5.9).
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
There are mixed feelings among students about national servicein Namibia. Around half feel that the Namibian governmentwould be justified in requiring that citizens complete someform of national or public service before enrolling at institu-
tions of higher learning. A third disagree. More (70%) agree that citi-
zens who have received government bursaries should complete some
form of national or public service or be required to work in the country
for several years after completion of their studies. Students from rural
backgrounds are generally more supportive of these measures than those
from urban areas.
Most students feel that changes in government policy to make emi-
gration more difficult will not stop nationals from moving away from
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Table 5.9: Ongoing Links with Namibia
Very Willing Willing Very Unwilling Unwilling Don’t know
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Give up your 83 7 175 15 444 38 423 36 57 5
home in Namibia
Take all your 47 4 101 9 429 36 548 47 51 4
possessions 
out of Namibia
Take all your 44 4 108 9 375 32 593 51 53 5
assets out of 
Namibia
Give up 46 4 85 7 297 25 683 58 61 5
citizenship 
in Namibia
home (Table 5.10). Thirty percent feel it would make no difference and
27% that it would make people more inclined to leave. However, there
is more support for the government to require people leaving profession-
al schools to do one year of national service in their area of expertise
and for the government to allow people to hold only one passport. 
On the other hand, there is some support for direct government
intervention (presumably not from the sizable minority) (Table 5.11).
For example, 45% think the government should enact legislation to
STAT E S O F VU L N E R A B I L I T Y: TH E FU T U R E BR A I N DR A I N O F TA L E N T T O SO U T H AFR I C A
52
Table 5.10: Responses to Possible Restrictions on Emigration
Probability of Much more More likely No difference Less likely Much less Don’t
emigration if likely (%) (%) (%) (%) likely (%) know (%)
government:
Took steps to make it 9 18 31 19 9 14
more difficult to 
emigrate
Required people 11 23 27 19 7 13
leaving professional 
schools to do one 
year national service 
in their area of 
expertise
Allowed people to 11 20 32 15 9 13
hold only one 
passport
Increased fees for 8 14 33 16 16 14
emigration
Table 5.11: Level of Support for Government Policy on Emigration
Category Yes (%) No (%) Don’t know (%)
Encourage economic development, 77 12 11
which will discourage people from leaving
Enact legislation, which will make it 45 36 19
more difficult for students to migrate
Institute measures, which encourage the 60 22 18
return of qualified professionals abroad
Forging links with destination countries of 42 35 23
emigrants from Namibia to discourage 
them from employing emigrants from 
emigrants from Namibia
Prohibit emigration 48 36 16
None (no steps to reduce emigration) 18 30 52
Other steps 8 18 74
make it more difficult for students to leave on graduation and 48% that
the government should simply prohibit emigration. As many as 42%
feel the government should enter into agreements with other countries
to discourage them from employing Namibians. Non-coercive measures
also garnered support. A massive 77% feel the best way to discourage
people from leaving is to promote economic development. As many as
60% feel that the government should encourage the return of qualified
Namibians from abroad. 
CONCLUSION
The most important finding of this study is that Namibia,despite a limited histor y of emigration, faces a future braindrain and its accompanying problems and challenges. There isconsiderable interest amongst Namibia’s future professionals
in leaving the country after graduation. On the other hand, not that
many have so far taken active steps to leave. At this point, therefore,
some of the sentiment may be wishful thinking rather than definite pos-
sibility. However, it is clear that there is a sizable minority of students
who seem fairly serious about leaving (perhaps around a third). Most
identified South Africa, the US and the UK as likely destinations. 
All Namibian students are extremely patriotic and relatively opti-
mistic about their country. As a result, no overwhelming reason could
be identified for wanting to leave. There seems to be a combination of
factors including, on the economic side, level of income, professional
advancement and cost of living, and, on the non-economic, family
encouragement and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
All Namibian students have a strong feeling that they have an
important role to play in the development of their country. Even mem-
bers of the sizable minority feel strongly about this. It is therefore not
surprising to find that students see departure from Namibia as temporary
rather than permanent and few intend to sever their links with home
once they had left. To attribute all of this to wanderlust or a youthful
enthusiasm to see the world or, more likely, to acquire further training,
might not be too short of the mark. Certainly the levels of restlessness
and desire to leave are not as high amongst Namibians as they are in
other countries of the region. At the same time, there are no grounds
for complacency or the sizable minority could rapidly become a signifi-
cant majority.
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